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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
Complex products and systems (CoPS), such as large defense equipment programs, 
are major capital goods in which customers play a central role from design through 
disposal (Davies & Hobday, 2005). A central idea of the research that this paper 
reports on is that the degree of complexity in CoPS may have a significant effect on 
the range of possible variance of their operations and support (O&S) costs. However, 
operational use and other factors also have an important part to play in the 
complexity of CoPS, which simple “parts count” approaches may miss. 
The research design presented is one of a pair of detailed case studies, based on 
the U.S./UK Harrier combat aircraft. In this work paper, the intention is to explore 
how different approaches in the U.S. and UK to O&S on the Harrier aircraft have 
impacted some of the key drivers of costs. In addition, initial comparisons are made 
with more complex (in parts count terms) aircraft. 
Introduction 
Life cycle costing of defense equipment for long-term operations and support (O&S) 
is extremely challenging. The estimating of system update costs, changes in the roles and 
missions that systems are used for, and shifts in the commercial and customer organisations 
that use and support equipment provide major uncertainties and make predictions of costs 
highly problematic. 
The research that this paper is based on seeks to address these issues by exploring 
complementary methods to existing costing approaches to help identify the range of 
variance in O&S costs. It does this through a number of comparative case studies. These 
are intended to illustrate the feasibility of comparative case studies in identifying the nature 
and scope of cost variance. 
The full report on this research will cover the cases, and other O&S related issues, in 
greater detail than this paper. However, the introduction of some of the cases in this work is 
intended to allow discussion of the state of the research at the present time and to guide its 
future development. 
Background 
The costing of major defense projects is an area of perennial difficulty. With ever-
rising program costs, and constant pressure on budgets, decision-makers are faced with a 
need for the highest-quality, robust cost estimates at the start of programs in order to allow 
the best informed decisions to be made. 
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While much work, over many decades, has been focused on estimating the costs of 
research and development (R&D), this activity still poses problems, as evinced by recent 
escalations in the Joint Strike Fighter program’s R&D cost estimates. However, an area of 
even greater challenge is operations and support (O&S), which is frequently where the 
largest part of overall weapon system life cycle costs reside. The unpredictability of the 
scope and role for the future use of major weapon systems, the multi-decade duration of 
their use, the increasing gaps between programs rendering analogous data “stale,” the 
extent and timing of major platform upgrades, etc., add up to a series of major challenges 
for cost estimators looking at O&S (Kirkpatrick, 1993). 
The need to make decisions that ensure that force levels and structures can be 
sustained over program lifetimes, while still at the early stages in a program, shows how 
understanding the degree of possible variance in O&S cost estimates matter—they can form 
the greater part of overall life cycle costs (LCCs). If they turn out greater than their estimated 
baseline then military force structures and capabilities may suffer, while legislators need to 
be aware of any potential for Nunn-McCurdy-type breaches that can lead to major re-
planning of programs, with attendant delays, etc. All of these factors mean that continued 
efforts should be made to ensure that the factors affecting O&S costs are understood and 
captured in estimates. 
Currently, the approach used by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is mandated 
through DoD Directive 5000.4 (USD[AT&L], 2006) and implemented by the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG). The approach taken is one of analytical cost estimates, using 
analogies from similar, older programs (where possible) to provide proxy data. A major 
problem in this is that new technologies (e.g., the move from aluminium to carbon fiber 
structures) may make it very difficult to “read across” old cost data. For some programs, it is 
also possible to provide “bottom up” estimates using the composition of more detailed cost 
estimates for components, sub-systems, etc., to build up an overall system cost (Arena et 
al., 2008; OSD-CAIG, 2007). However, this approach is often not practical in the early 
stages of programs, where detailed design data is not available. 
The research that this paper reports on seeks to explore a complementary approach 
to current analytical methodologies in early program stages, in order to add to the 
robustness of cost estimates. It aims to enable better estimates of overall costs to be made 
by exploring ways of understanding of the degree of possible cost variance from the 
baseline provided by analytical techniques. 
Research Approach 
In the acquisition of complex products and systems (CoPS), such as large defense 
equipment programs, customers play a central role, from design through disposal. As part of 
the work undertaken in the CoPS Innovation Centre at the University of Sussex in the United 
Kingdom, an exploration was undertaken of how civilian firms that create CoPS in fields 
such as communication and transportation move through the value chain by shifting their 
“centre of gravity” (Davies & Hobday, 2005). This is typically done to allow them to modify 
their business model to profit from O&S activities and to ensure that the customer gets a 
better product and/or better value for his or her money. Implicit in this idea is the ability of 
organisations undertaking O&S for CoPS to change the way that the activities in O&S are 
carried out to reduce costs for a given capability, with support for this coming from Gregory 
(1989) and Hurcombe (1989). 
This provides a counter to the notion put forward by Reed (1978) that the O&S costs 
are effectively “locked in” by fundamental design decisions taken early in a program. Reed 
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suggests that this holds true for all combat aircraft, based on extensive empirical case 
studies, and that the chances to change maintenance costs are limited by this. 
Both of these views have problems. The first is that Davies and Hobday are looking 
at CoPS that are far more predictable and relatively “static” in their use (e.g., telecoms, 
construction, railways) compared to the more “dynamic” nature of use that many defense 
equipment programs face. Second, Reed notes that the O&S lock in of costs may only apply 
to equipment where system repair is undertaken by replacement (rather than repair) of 
components. 
These two issues mean that there is a need to explore further whether the type of 
equipment affects O&S costs, as well as whether the nature of O&S activities affects the 
degree of cost lock in. Is it the case that what can be termed “Dynamic CoPS” —such as 
combat aircraft, with major issues around operations in many changing situations, with 
variable levels of use/damage over many years—cannot be predictable enough in use to 
benefit from different solutions to their O&S needs? Is it also the case that by exploring the 
way Dynamic CoPS are supported, beyond repair by replacement, lock in of costs can be 
avoided? If this is the case, how does one design new equipment, or modify old equipment, 
to benefit from such an approach (for current approaches to such design, see Woodford, 
1999)? 
The research design to explore these questions is one of a set of detailed case 
studies, based on the U.S./UK Harrier combat aircraft. This aircraft currently serves with the 
United States Marine Corps and served with the UK Royal Air Force and Royal Navy until 
the end of 2010. 
The main comparisons in this paper are between UK and U.S. Harrier costs, with the 
U.S. F/A-18 program and the UK Tornado also featured. The data used has been made 
available by UK sources. This work will be further extended by using U.S.-originated data 
and the concepts of other researchers in the field, such as Raman et al. (2003) on the F/A-
18, to assist in the findings to be reported at the end of the program of research. 
The main idea explored in the cases is that the degree of complexity in a project may 
have a significant effect on the range of possible variance in O&S costs. An initial 
assumption, that will be tested using the cases, is that the greater the degree of complexity, 
the narrower the “room for manoeuvre” in reducing O&S costs. Essentially, the idea tested is 









Figure 1. Aircraft Program Comparison Framework 
The cases explore the following aspects of O&S: 
1. The degrees of variance in O&S requirements between Harriers in the UK 
and U.S. and other aircraft (F/A-18 and Tornado), to establish how the 
degree of “designed in” complexity, patterns of operational use, etc., may 
vary. 
2. The UK’s Harrier GR.9 upgrade, to explore how design lock in issues were 
tackled in a system update never imagined by its original designers or users. 
It should be noted that it is an assumption in this paper, and in the ongoing research, 
that factors such as “arisings” and “operational effects,” discussed in the next section, have 
a rough equivalence in cost terms across all users. This is assumed in terms of the idea that 
they result in rectification actions that lead to maintenance man hours that are charged at 
nationally equivalent rates, as well as the consumption of spare parts that have similar 
costs. On this basis, the factors explored are taken to be good proxies for actual costs 
incurred over time. 
Case Study 1: Aircraft O&S, Design, and Use 
The approach to estimating the degree of complexity put forward in this research is 
based on the idea that it is not component count or lines of code that matter, but rather the 
number of interactions, both between engineered components, the way an aircraft is used, 
and the organisations undertaking the O&S activities on the aircraft. The assumption is that 
the overall effect of these interactions would be revealed by comparisons between arisings 
(e.g., defects) and their related operational effects (e.g., “failures”). An aircraft can still 
continue to fly a mission with an arising, but an operational effect will mean that a mission 
cannot continue as planned. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the level of arisings and operational effects on a 
number of aircraft platforms. The data presented are relatively old (mid-1980s) but have the 
great value of being for a similar period of use for each platform. Finding data that are 
comparative on such a basis is essential to allow meaningful comparisons to be made. 
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Three main points should be noted in relation to the data in Figure 2. First, the 
selection of three variants of the Harrier family, from two “generations” used by the Royal Air 
Force (RAF), Royal Navy, and United States Marine Corps (USMC), allows the effects of 
issues such as different levels of technology, operational use patterns, etc., to be compared. 
Second, for the AV-8B, F/A-18A/B, and Tornado, the data presented are for early production 
batches during a period where they were still being introduced into service. Third, and of 
great significance for this research, is the difficulty in comparing U.S. and UK data, which 
use different accounting practices. 
 
Figure 2. Aircraft Reliability and Failure Rates 
Note. Figures are per 1,000 flying hours. 
The comparison between the three Harrier variants illustrates a number of issues. 
RAF Harrier sorties were of lower duration than Royal Navy ones, as well as being more 
punishing on the airframe since they were flown at a lower level. The Harrier is well known 
for subjecting much of its avionics and airframe systems to a punishing acoustic, thermal, 
and vibration environment, which is the cause of many system failures and was not 
amenable to prediction using standard methods, test spectra, etc. (see Beier, 1987). Flight 
at low level and high throttle settings exacerbate these problems, which the data clearly 
show. However, the box on the right of Figure 2 illustrates that these differences can be 
simplified into a general statement on the effect of sortie lengths on the occurrence rates for 
arisings and operational effects, at least for aircraft of a similar technology level. 
The Royal Navy Sea Harriers were of a similar technology level to the RAF aircraft, 
although built five to ten years later, with more modern avionics and some system 
improvements incorporated. The AV-8B Harriers of the USMC shown in Figure 2 were of a 
new generation design, incorporating a new wing made of carbon fiber, new avionics, and 
substantially revised systems. However, the retention of major parts of the fuselage, made in 
the UK, that were derived from the first generation Harriers allows a good basis for 
comparison. The data in Figure 2 illustrate that the newer Harriers were more reliable 
overall. In part, this is due to the new technology as well as to the aircraft being new in 
service, although they were about the same age as the Royal Navy Sea Harriers and 
operated from shore and ship in a similar fashion, although on different mission profiles. 
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The data show that the AV-8B Harriers had similar, if slightly lower, arising rates to 
the Sea Harriers but much lower operational effect rates. In part, this was due to 
environmental factors—the weather in Yuma, Arizona, is much better than at Yeovilton in 
the UK, while operations from ships in the North Atlantic as well as  operations in the South 
Atlantic had an adverse effect on Sea Harrier rates. The greater fuel capacity, and more 
efficient wing for cruising flight, of the AV-8B allowed longer sorties than those of the Sea 
Harrier, helping to give a favourable operational effects figure. 
Some of the comparisons between the U.S. and UK Harriers were made possible by 
some data for the USMC’s own first generation Harriers. However, conversion of U.S. 
figures to UK formats do mean that accounting allocations need to be made that may be 
slightly wrong, hence the spread of figures of the AV-8B and the F/A-18A/B. Although the 
main figures presented here relate to comparisons between the Harrier family, data are also 
provided for the more complex F/A-18A/B and the British PANAVIA Tornado GR.1. In the 
case of these aircraft, it was thought that the major design differences would make 
comparison more difficult. However, there was some hope in the fact that they are both twin-
engined types, and that the complexity of the “swing wing” on the Tornado may have some 
equivalent in the added complexity of the “navalization” features for the F/A-18 Hornet. 
However, as Figure 2 shows, it is apparent that the differences in the arisings and 
operational effects figures were very significant. This is explicable in part due to factors 
mentioned in relation to the Harrier data—different mission profiles, different environmental 
effects, etc., but the data appear to reveal the fact that the F/A-18A/B was inherently more 
reliable by design. An attempt at “controlling” UK/U.S. accounting differences using old F-4 
Phantom data did not provide any greater insight. Additional data recently acquired, and still 
being analyzed, do show that later batches of Tornado were significantly more reliable. 
Indications from this data, as well as from interviews undertaken, are that this is in part 
explicable due to the RAF failing to support the Tornado using the maintenance strategy for 
which it was designed. This was later rectified, with a marked improvement in reliability, 
albeit at great cost. 
This data analysis is still progressing and is being associated with analysis of the 
later F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (e.g., by using insights from Raman et al., 2003). However, it 
is interesting to note the relative similarities between AV-8B and F/A-18 data in Figure 2, 
both aircraft originating at the same time from the same design team and sharing some 
systems. Analysis of these similarities, and their causes, is also ongoing and will be reported 
more fully at the end of the research. 
What theses data are beginning to illustrate is the idea that interactions are not 
necessarily about the number of components parts but rather are caused by a range of 
factors. The number of components in the Harrier variants were not greatly different 
between them, but the figures shown in Figure 2 are. These differences come about through 
the effect of sortie rates, operational flight profiles, and environmental factors etc., which are 
the sources of the interactions that the aircraft components and the overall system endure. 
To understand the factors that affect O&S more deeply, an example of a part of the 
aircraft that were largely common to all three variants of the Harrier was required. The main 
undercarriage (landing gear) units were selected1. Data for the share of overall O&S LCC 
                                                
1 The Harrier has an unusual “bicycle” main undercarriage unit, with wingtip outriggers on the RAF Harrier I/Sea 
Harrier and mid-wing outriggers of different design on the AV-8B. However, the main units have only minor 
differences (e.g., some strengthening and lash-down lugs for ship-borne use). 
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costs of the RAF Harrier I’s undercarriage are shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that the 
undercarriage’s share of the LCC O&S costs can be seen as being “typical” of other major 
systems (i.e., they are not unusual in their percentage of overall costs). This was seen as 
making them a good candidate to explore further. 
 
Figure 3. RAF Harrier I Undercarriage (and Other System) LCC O&S Costs 
Undercarriage units of combat aircraft are high-value items that are designed to meet 
an operating life according to a certain assumed spectrum of use. They are built to last and 
are safety-critical because their failure during takeoff or landing can lead to total loss of the 
aircraft. Undercarriage units are exposed to heavy stresses throughout their life. These 
factors can lead to a heavy maintenance burden, with frequent inspections required and 
repair or replacement often required. For naval aircraft, or STOVL aircraft such as the 
Harrier, there are many additional sources of fatigue and other damage to the 
undercarriage, compared to land-based aircraft. One key difference between UK and U.S. 
undercarriage O&S is that maintenance of such units are a more specialised trade in the 
U.S., to the extent of personnel specialising down to the level of main or nose gear support. 
Operations on the Harrier have led to constant discoveries of undercarriage O&S 
issues that needed to be addressed. Although the main undercarriage was very robust, 
being designed to operate off base and to take many unusual loads, such as landing while 
flying backwards, these discoveries were nearly impossible to predict and meant that the 
real-world experience of the undercarriage in use differed from the original design spectrum 
that they were built to meet. For example, as Burton (1996) reports, seemingly minor 
differences in the build quality of the ski-jump ramps of the UK’s Invincible Class light aircraft 
carriers seriously affected the life of the undercarriage units, depending on which ship the 
aircraft was being operated from. These build quality differences were not part of the original 
modelling undertaken for a new ski-jump design and its effect on the aircraft’s operating 
limits and led to cracking in the undercarriage units. 
This damage suffered was not particular to the role or mission profile of the aircraft, 
or to the type of Harrier, but to the particular ship of a class that they were operating from. 
The damage was expensive to repair but absolutely necessary. This one example is given 
here to illustrate the peculiarities of the type of incidents that make up the data presented in 
Figure 2 and to give an idea of how they can emerge unexpectedly. However, the fact that 
the Harrier’s undercarriage was of a robust design meant that there were not any failures—
just arisings that were repairable (and are similarly so for the AV-8B; see Hullander & 
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Walling, 2008). The rate and nature of these arisings, however, were not “designed in,” 
although the original characteristics of the undercarriage units were. The arisings were due 
to the peculiarities of the aircraft’s use. 
These types of issues have emerged in a range of other examples in the research. 
Not just the type of operational flight profile but even who is flying the aircraft can have an 
effect. As one interviewee (ex-Tornado aircrew) put it: “If the same aircraft is flown by the 
same people every day it doesn’t break.” Put simply, the fewer times switches, ejector-seat 
rigging, etc., are adjusted, the fewer interactions and the fewer failures occur. So while it is 
true that the design stage may well lock in some aspects of O&S—some parts are more 
liable to break than others and some are easier to fix, depending on how they are 
designed—this is not the whole story. 
Case Study 2. Harrier GR.9 COTS Upgrade 
The first case study illustrated how the needs for O&S can be affected by operational 
use. In the second case, we will explore how the interactions in contracting for O&S and 
their link to operationally urgent updates can be key drivers of costs. We will also look at 
how these costs can be contained though the use of COTS technology insertion and the 
innovative approach taken to it. The case explores the update of the mission computer on 
the Harrier GR.9 program, undertaken by BAE Systems. As Roark et al. (2008) have noted, 
it is harder to have visibility of costs when O&S is implemented by a contractor, which 
means that understanding how contractors undertake such activities will be valuable to 
understanding the causes of O&S costs. 
The Royal Air Force’s Harrier GR.9 mission systems update was termed the Harrier 
Integrated Weapons Programme (IWP), devised to bring together a number of discrete 
weapon-system enhancement projects. The IWP formed the basis of the GR.9 and T.12 
aircraft. Principally, a state-of-the-art MIL-STD-1760 Stores Management System (SMS) 
was required which, combined with the new High Order Language (Ada) Operational Flight 
Programme (OFP) software and a new Open System Mission Computer (OSMC), permitted 
the aircraft to interact with new weapons and sensors. 
In April 2002, BAE Systems received an interim contract for the development of the 
full GR.9 aircraft. A further £150 million contract was signed in January 2003 for non-
recurring work, mainly software development and flight testing. The first aircraft flew in May 
2003, with an initial batch of aircraft completed by the end of 2003. Operational release 
occurred in September 2006. The full modification programme had a value of £500 million, 
including support costs. The update programme was managed through the Future 
Integrated Support Team (FIST), a joint industry/MoD initiative, with engineering design 
undertaken at BAE Systems Farnborough and development and flight testing based at BAE 
Systems’ Warton site. The scope of the Harrier GR9 upgrade work covered the following: 
1. baseline recovery, re-design, and re-implementation for significant aspects of 
the avionic system, together with associated sub-system design; 
2. procurement, integration, and testing; 
3. a complete recovery and rewrite of the software for the central computer 
controlling the avionic and weapon systems (some 250,000 lines of code); 
4. a major airframe change and the rewiring of the aircraft (over five miles of 
wiring per aircraft was removed or replaced); 
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5. the selection and integrated management of major international vendors 
through competitive tender; 
6. providing structural and aerodynamic clearances; 
7. the management of five instrumented development Harriers to provide test 
clearance and certification of each capability; and 
8. the manufacturing of parts and equipment and their embodiment to upgrade 
to GR9 standard across the Harrier fleet. (Pryce, 2009) 
It was therefore a very extensive program, involving many participants in the 
industry, government, the RAF, and the Royal Navy (who operated the GR.9 after their own 
dedicated Sea Harrier fleet was retired in 2006). Matters were further complicated by the 
need to incorporate unplanned rapid technology insertion (RTI) activities as a result of 
ongoing UK Harrier operations in Afghanistan. These tested the ability of the technical 
systems and organisations involved in the update effort to adjust to changing needs. 
At the heart of the GR.9 update was the use of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
mission computer system. This shared a common chassis and some cards with the OSCAR 
mission computer that was used by Boeing to update the USMC’s fleet of AV-8B Harriers. 
The OSCAR programme had seen the first major use of COTS computing by a U.S. combat 
aircraft and was, overall, a success. However, it did reveal that, while Moore’s Law may 
allow a doubling of computer power every eighteen months, the integration and testing cycle 
on combat aircraft was the key driver of program timescales and associated costs (Adams, 
2002; Hoppe & Winter, 1996). 
In addition, the timescales during which combat aircraft operate, with the need for 
ongoing support for decades, is a major issue for COTS insertion—the chips used may well 
be out of production, and possibly unsupported by their original commercial supplier, many 
years before the military aircraft they are installed in stop flying. These two timescale issues 
(testing slowing down COTS insertion, with use ensuring COTS chips’ long-term use instead 
of rapid replacement) have perhaps been behind the apparent lack of delivery of all the early 
promises of COTS. 
With the Harrier, there are additional issues that exacerbate the testing cycle. 
Vibration levels are not based on a fixed standard to which a system can necessarily be 
certificated before use on the aircraft (Beier, 1987).  Special certification of aircraft systems 
is therefore required on Harriers, possibly extending the testing cycle and further slowing 
and/or limiting COTS insertion. In this environment of technical, contractual, organisational, 
and operational complexity, with a multitude of interactions between different factors 
affecting O&S, it is very difficult to know how contractors can plan and/or profit from O&S 
activities without adding cost upfront (or locking it in for later) due to the difficulties of 
estimation that such uncertainty brings. However, it appears that the Harrier GR.9 case 
study does highlight that it can be done. 
As with the example of the Harrier undercarriage given above, the mission computer 
is a safety-critical item. This, in part, explains why the testing cycle is so long—it is 
necessary to ensure that the safety of the system has been proven, and analytical models or 
bench testing are not adequate to do this. However, the need to incorporate both pre-
planned, incremental capability levels to the mission computer operational flight program 
(OFP), as well as changing OFP software in response to emerging RTI needs in light of 
urgent operational requirement emerging from Afghan operations, meant that a stable, 
relatively slow approach to the testing cycle was not possible. 
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In order to get the required results in the shortest possible time, BAE Systems’ 
Harrier GR.9 team decided to use a number of shortcuts in developing the safety case of the 
mission computer. These consisted of both simple tools and methods of working that gave 
visibility and allowed communication to all participants in the company, its suppliers, and 
customers in the RAF and Royal Navy (Lucas, 2008). This considerably speeded up the 
insertion of new technology. Central to the ability to do this was BAE Systems’ control of the 
OFP, rather than control residing in the supplier of the computer itself, or in the customer’s 
O&S organisation. Since the OFP was frequently updated, such control was what allowed 
BAE systems to speed up the process. The OFP was particular to the Harrier GR.9, unlike 
on the OSCAR program for the AV-8B, where the OFP was developed as part of a modular 
OFP “family” for a number of aircraft programs (Logan, 2000). In addition, on GR.9 COTS, 
software languages such as C++ (as used on the OSCAR program) were used less 
frequently than the older Ada language, which had a well understood development 
environment. 
With the changes to the OFP being unpredictable, an important way to minimise 
costs on the Harrier GR.9 upgrade, and in ongoing O&S activities such as RTI, was to 
minimise the time it took to implement them. While this is a simple enough idea, the example 
of how the UK GR.9 programme was able to implement them much more quickly than on the 
U.S. OSCAR program, despite the use of a similar computer and airframe, shows that the 
issue of design lock-in is not as limiting as may be expected. The flexibility that 
organisational structures can allow to overcome such “hard” technical features as well as 
accommodate the unpredictable changes to O&S activities that operational service revealed 
is a key to controlling future O&S costs. 
Discussion, Summary, and Conclusions 
In this brief paper, we have seen that the causes of operations and support costs are 
many and varied. In particular, this variance occurs on platforms such as the Harrier family 
of aircraft, which are notionally quite similar. 
This finding in itself calls into question the idea of using past data to project future 
costs of new systems. If there are significant differences in the O&S costs and the causes of 
the costs between similar platforms then it is essential that they are understood in detail 
before being applied to future designs. It may be that the future design is particularly 
susceptible to some particular issue that is “lost in the noise” of aggregated data. 
A case in point given in this paper is the operation of UK Sea Harrier aircraft from 
ski-jump-equipped aircraft carriers. The fact that one of these ships caused damage to 
aircraft undercarriage units was not catastrophic in this case, but in large part, it was due to 
the undercarriage being of robust design, thanks to very different original requirements. If 
the undercarriage had been designed by the assumed loads for the ski-jump, modelled as 
part of the design and clearance programme, it could well have failed in service use, leading 
to expensive redesign, remanufacture, and modification work. 
Similarly, the Harrier GR.9 case illustrates how, despite minor overt differences from 
the AV-8B, the mission system upgrade was carried out via quicker testing cycles, leading to 
lower costs than might otherwise have been incurred. Such specific differences between two 
apparently similar cases would need to be understood before planning and costing the 
system architecture, O&S infrastructure, and update roadmap of a new platform based on 
data from them. 
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Regarding the basic question of technological lock in of costs, it appears that Reed 
(1978) and others who advocate this view are not correct. Clearly, patterns of operational 
use, approaches to O&S, and relatively minor differences between successive versions of 
an aircraft can have a significant impact on O&S activities and, thereby, on associated 
costs. In the case of related, relatively simple aircraft, as with the Harrier family, this still 
allows useful data to be gathered on the effects of complexity factors over and above “parts 
count”–type estimates. Their relative similarity allows for this. 
With more technically complex, higher parts count aircraft that are unrelated, it 
appears that it is not possible to use data from one to predict the O&S costs of another —
the Tornado and F/A-18 comparison shows that similarly complex (in parts count terms) 
aircraft can have very different O&S figures. 
Regarding the idea that Dynamic CoPS can benefit contractors through O&S 
contracting arrangements, despite their much higher levels of unpredictability, compared to 
static CoPS, the cases drawn from Harrier, at least, show that this may be possible. As 
such, Davies and Hobday’s (2005) work may be applicable. However, it may not be directly 
applied in an easy form, since using the “solutions” approach they propose to O&S support 
of combat aircraft would require a detailed, in-depth knowledge of the nature and degree of 
the variance of possible O&S effects and of the wide range of factors that cause them. 
These seem much wider, and more unpredictable, than in static CoPS. 
Building on these interim findings lies at the heart of the ongoing research program 
that this paper derives from. With a clear idea of the effect of all the factors, and their 
interactions, that cause O&S issues and their related costs, it is thought that a more useful 
method of applying data from existing programs to future ones can be developed. This work 
is due to be reported by September 2011. 
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